The Role of Information in Building Reputation in an Investment/Trust Game by Lunawat, R
UC Irvine
UC Irvine Previously Published Works
Title
The Role of Information in Building Reputation in an Investment/Trust Game
Permalink
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/4643k0mz
Journal
European Accounting Review, 22(3)
ISSN
0963-8180
Author
Lunawat, R
Publication Date
2013-09-01
DOI
10.1080/09638180.2012.748256
 
Peer reviewed
eScholarship.org Powered by the California Digital Library
University of California
1 
 
The Role of Information in Building Reputation in an 
Investment / Trust Game
*, ** 
 
 
Radhika Lunawat
†
 
 
 
 
November 2012 
 
 
 
* This paper is based on my PhD dissertation at the University of Minnesota. I am indebted to 
my dissertation committee for valuable suggestions and guidance: John Dickhaut (Chair), Beth 
Allen, Chandra Kanodia, and Gregory Waymire. I wish to thank Ron King, Christian Leuz, 
Harry Evans, Jack Stecher, Regina Anctil, associate editor John Christensen, and two anonymous 
referees for helpful comments and suggestions. I also wish to thank workshop participants at the 
London School of Economics, the Indian School of Business, the University of Pittsburgh, 
Argyros School of Business and Economics (Chapman University), the University of Toronto, 
the University of Alberta, and the Economic Science Institute (Chapman University); and 
referees for the National Science Foundation Doctoral Dissertation Grant and for the University 
of Minnesota Graduate School Fellowship; and various conference participants.  
 
**I gratefully acknowledge support from National Science Foundation Doctoral Dissertation 
Grant Number 0820455 and from Accounting Research Center at Carlson School of 
Management, University of Minnesota. 
 
†
Tepper School of Business, Carnegie Mellon University, 5000 Forbes Avenue, Pittsburgh, PA – 
15213; e-mail: rlunawat@andrew.cmu.edu and Opus School of Business, University of St Thomas, 
1000 LaSalle Avenue, Minneapolis, MN – 55403; e-mail: rlunawat@stthomas.edu.  
 
2 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This article analyzes the role of information in building reputation in an investment/trust game. 
The model allows for information asymmetry in a finitely repeated sender–receiver game and 
solves for sequential equilibrium to show that if there are some trustworthy managers who 
always disclose their private information and choose to return a fair proportion of the firm’s 
income as dividend to the investor, then a rational manager will mimic such behaviour in an 
attempt to earn a reputation for being trustworthy. The rational manager will mimic with 
probability 1 in the early periods of the game. The investor, too, will invest with probability 1 in 
these periods. However, in the later periods, the rational manager will mimic with a certain 
probability strictly less than 1. The probability will be such that it will make the investor 
indifferent between investing and not investing, and he, in turn, will invest with a probability 
(strictly less than 1) that will make the rational manager indifferent between mimicking and not 
mimicking; that is, the game will begin with pure strategy play but will switch to mixed strategy 
play. There is one exception, though: when the investor’s ex ante beliefs about the manager’s 
trustworthiness are exceptionally high, the game will continue in a pure strategy, and the switch 
to mixed strategy play will never occur. Identical results obtain if the manager’s choice of 
whether to share his private information with the investor is replaced by exogenously imposed 
information sharing. 
 
Keywords: Information, Disclosure, Reputation, Trust 
 
JEL codes: M41, D82, C11, C73. 
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1. Introduction 
In the United States, home to some of the largest corporate collapses, trust in 
business collapsed as well, dropping 20 percentage points over the course of one 
year. With only 38% of informed public in the United States trusting business 
today, levels are the lowest they have been in the Barometer’s tracking history—
even lower than in the wake of Enron and the dot-com bust. . . . For U.S. 
businesses, this downturn marks a stark reversal from the steady uptick in trust of 
the last five years. 
—Edelman Trust Barometer, 2009 
In the face of the financial meltdown, one of the challenges managers face is to rebuild 
their reputation for being trustworthy. This article analyzes the role of information in facilitating 
such investor–manager trust and reputation in an investment/trust game. 
The investment/trust game (Berg et al., 1995) is a sender–receiver game in which the 
sender/investor is endowed with some wealth and chooses whether to invest it in a 
receiver/manager. The receiver is endowed with some production technology to which he 
channels the investment for productive uses, thereby generating a strictly positive income for the 
firm comprising of the investor and the manager. From the firm’s income, the manager chooses 
whether to pay a dividend back to the investor and then keeps the residual for himself. When this 
game is repeated for some periods (Dickhaut et al., forthcoming), it allows the managers an 
opportunity to build a reputation for being trustworthy. Fundamental to such reputation building 
is the existence of a trustworthy manager, which is defined as a manager who pays back a fair 
proportion of the firm’s income as dividend to the investor. The rational manager tries to build a 
reputation for being trustworthy by mimicking such behaviour in the early periods of a repeated 
investment game. 
The only source of uncertainty in the repeated investment game is the manager’s type, 
and in the early periods of the game, it is partially resolved by the manger’s observable action of 
paying back the dividend. Exploring the role of information in such a setting necessitates the 
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introduction of an additional source of uncertainty, namely, uncertainty regarding the state of 
nature (Dickhaut et al., 2012). The deterministic income of the firm is now replaced by one that 
is contingent on the state of nature. Depending on the state of nature that obtains, the firm’s 
income may be high or low. The manager always observes the state of nature, but the investor 
does not. This information asymmetry implies that a low dividend could mean one of the 
following two things for an investor: (1) it could be that the firm’s income is low or (2) it could 
be that the firm’s income is high but a rational manager is trying to pretend that a low income 
obtained. Information sharing with the investor becomes important in such a setting and has 
potential implications for managerial efforts at building reputation for trustworthiness. This 
article analyzes such a reputation-building role of information. 
When information sharing is exogenously imposed and alleviates information 
asymmetry, the previously mentioned definition of a trustworthy manager suffices. However, if 
information sharing with the investor is voluntary, then a consideration of reputation building 
necessitates changing the definition of a trustworthy manager to one who pays back a fair 
proportion of the firm’s income as dividend to the investor and voluntarily discloses his private 
information about the state of nature. Mimicking a trustworthy type disciplines the actions of a 
rational manager in that it takes away from him the option of paying back a low dividend (and 
thereby pretending that a low state of nature has occurred) when the high state of nature has 
occurred. Whether information sharing is exogenously imposed or is a voluntary choice of the 
manager, what is important is the disciplining role it has for a rational manager. 
From a reputation building standpoint, such perfect mimicking and concomitant 
discipline are optimal for a rational manager in the early periods of a finitely repeated game. This 
is so because in the early periods, the expected future benefits from mimicking exceed the costs 
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of such mimicking. The benefits to the manager flow from future investments of the investor. 
The cost arises from having to pay back some portion of the income of the firm as dividend to 
the investor. In the early periods, the benefit of expected future investments exceeds the cost of 
dividend in the current period, making perfect mimicking optimal. The investor is a Bayesian 
updater, and perfect mimicking by the rational manager implies that the investor’s posterior 
beliefs about a manager’s trustworthiness are the same as his prior beliefs about the manager’s 
trustworthiness. The investor chooses to invest if his beliefs about the manager’s trustworthiness 
are above the threshold specified by the model. This threshold increases over time because the 
investor knows that the rational manager has a strong incentive to mimic the trustworthy type 
and pay a fair dividend in the early periods. On one hand, the investment threshold increases 
over time, but on the other hand, perfect mimicking implies that the investor’s beliefs about the 
manager’s trustworthiness do not change. The model specifies the point in the repeated game at 
which the beliefs sustained by perfect mimicking will be below the investment threshold. 
To prevent beliefs from falling below the investment threshold, the rational manager 
switches from a strategy of perfect mimicking to a strategy of selective mimicking; that is, he 
mimics the trustworthy manager with a certain probability (specified by the model) strictly less 
than 1. The probability is such that the investor’s updated beliefs about the manager’s 
trustworthiness are exactly on the investment threshold. Note that the investor invests with 
certainty only when his beliefs are above the investment threshold. However, when his beliefs 
are exactly on the investment threshold, he is indifferent between investing and not investing. He 
chooses to invest with a certain probability (specified by the model) that makes the rational 
manager indifferent between mimicking and not mimicking. 
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This article is closely related to a couple of recent papers that analyze reputation and 
disclosure. Einhorn and Ziv (2008) analyze the reputation of a firm for being informationally 
endowed and how disclosure impacts such reputation. Beyer and Dye (forthcoming) look at how 
a manager builds reputation for being a type that shares his private information. They cast it as a 
manager’s decision-making problem and ensure consistency with a pricing function. I cast it in a 
game theoretic framework, in which both the (rational) manager and the investor are strategic 
players who act in their best interest. In the Beyer and Dye model, there is uncertainty about the 
manager’s type and about his information endowment, allowing for studying the effects the 
interaction of the two sources of uncertainty have on reputation building. In my model, the 
manager always receives private information. The uncertainty here is about the manager’s type 
and the state of nature. Furthermore, the Beyer and Dye model has a continuum of manager’s 
types, and this allows for equilibrium in pure strategies. In contrast, types in my model are binary 
(namely, trustworthy and untrustworthy/rational), and equilibrium allows for mixed strategy 
play. 
This approach of binary types, uncertainty about types, and possibility of mixed strategies 
in equilibrium follows from reputation models in economics. For example, Kreps and Wilson 
(1982) solve a sequential equilibrium for a finitely repeated monopolist entry deterrence game in 
which the monopolist is either strong or weak and the uncertainty pertains to the type of the 
monopolist. Similarly, Kreps et al. (1982) solve for a sequential equilibrium in a finitely repeated 
prisoners’ dilemma game. I solve for a sequential equilibrium in my model, but relative to these 
reputation models, I have an additional source of uncertainty: the uncertainty about the state of 
nature. 
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The rest of the article proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3 
defines and characterizes the equilibrium of the model. Section 4 discusses the properties of the 
equilibrium. Section 5 summarizes and concludes. 
 
2. Model 
There are two players, a sender/investor and a receiver/manager. Nature moves first and 
selects the manager’s type to be either trustworthy or untrustworthy. I will define momentarily 
what I mean by each type. The manager knows his type, but the investor does not. The game 
then proceeds through n periods, in each of which the investor and the manager make a sequence 
of choices. In what follows, the subscript t (t = 1, 2, . . . , n) will be used to denote a period. The 
manager chooses whether to commit to truthfully disclosing private information he will learn 
over the course of the game. A decision to commit to such truthful disclosure is denoted by dt = 
1, and a decision not to commit to such truthful disclosure is denoted by dt = 0. Note that the 
manager is not privy to the private information at the time he makes the choice of whether to 
commit to truthfully disclosing it; rather, it is information he will learn over the course of the 
game. It is as if the manager is making a choice of an accounting system—the manager could 
choose an accounting system that will generate information that both the investor and the 
manager will learn (by choosing to commit to truthfully disclosing), or alternatively, the manager 
could choose an accounting system that will generate information only the manager will learn 
(by choosing not to commit to truthfully disclosing). Note that if the manager were instead to 
make a decision on truthfully disclosing his private information after he learns it, then such a 
decision would predicate on the information content. For example, if the private information is 
good, he may choose to disclose it, but if it is bad, he may choose to withhold it. The ex ante 
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commitment modelled in this article obviates commingling managerial strategic considerations 
arising from the information content with the strategic considerations arising from innate 
building of reputation for being trustworthy and allows focus on the latter. 
The investor sees whether the manager has committed to truthfully disclosing his private 
information. He is endowed with e > 0 units of wealth and chooses whether to invest in the 
manager. Regardless of whether the investor chooses to invest, e is common knowledge; that is, 
both the investor and the manager know the amount of wealth with which the investor is 
endowed. The investor’s decision to invest is denoted by mt = e, and the investor’s decision not 
to invest is denoted by mt = 0. If the investor chooses to invest, then the amount e is multiplied 
by a multiplier λt before the manager receives it; λt  {l, h} and is equally likely to be either l or 
h in every period: 1 ≤ l < 2 < h, l + h > 4. It is as if the manager has some production technology 
because of which he is able to grow the investment of e to et. The multiplied amount (eλt) may 
be thought of as the gross income of the firm comprising the investor and the manager. I will 
explain momentarily the parameter restriction of 1 ≤ l < 2 < h, l + h > 4. 
Now the manager receives et and learns t. However, the investor learns λt only if the 
manager had earlier committed to truthfully disclosing his private information; that is, if the 
manager had chosen an accounting system that generates information both the investor and the 
manager learn, then the investor learns λt. Otherwise, if the manager had chosen an accounting 
system that generates information only the manager learns, then the investor does not learn λt. In 
this sense, λt is the manager’s private information—he always learns the realized value of λt, but 
the investor’s knowledge of λt is dependent on the manager’s choice of accounting system. 
After the manager receives et, he chooses to send back kt to the investor. If t = l, kt  
{0, el/2}; if t = h, kt  {0, el/2, eh/2}. The idea is that if the low state of the world (namely, l) 
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occurs, then the manager either can choose to send back half or choose to send back nothing to 
the investor. However, if the high state of the world occurs (namely, h), then the manager has the 
additional option of choosing to send back an amount (namely, el/2) consistent with the low state 
of the world having occurred
1
. The investor receives kt, and the manager keeps the residual et − 
kt. The amount sent back by the manager (kt) may be thought of as the dividend the manager pays 
to the investor. A trustworthy manager is defined as one who always chooses to disclose (dt = 1) 
and always chooses to return half of what he receives (i.e., if t = l, he chooses kt = el/2, and if t 
= h, he chooses kt = eh/2). An untrustworthy manager is defined as a manager who is not 
trustworthy; in other words, the untrustworthy manager is a rational manager whose action is 
guided by self-interest. I have l/2 < 1 so that a realization λt = l implies a negative net return for 
the investor, h/2 > 1 so that a realization λt = h implies a positive net return for the investor, and 
(l + h)/4 > 1 so that the expected net return for the investor, if the manager is trustworthy, is 
positive. Risk neutrality, additively separable utility, and no time discounting are assumed. 
                                                 
1
Note that this idea can also be captured by expanding the set of kt to include more elements than the ones specified 
here. The equilibrium and other results derived will be qualitatively similar. The set of kt used here is the most 
parsimonious one possible. 
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Figure 1. Timeline of the model 
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3. Equilibrium 
Because this is a finitely repeated game with two players and uncertainty about the type 
of one of the players, I can solve for either a sequential equilibrium or a perfect Bayesian 
equilibrium. Kreps and Wilson (1982) and Kreps et al. (1982) are examples of papers that solve 
for a sequential equilibrium in such reputation games, whereas Dickhaut et al. (forthcoming) is 
an example of a paper that solves for a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Either solution concept will 
yield identical results in this article because Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) show that if each 
player has at most two possible types (the manager can be either trustworthy or 
untrustworthy/rational in the model in this article), then the sets of perfect Bayesian equilibria 
and sequential equilibria coincide. 
A sequential equilibrium of the game described in Section 2 is defined as follows. An 
equilibrium comprises a strategy for each player and, for each period t, a function DtP  that takes 
the history of moves up to period t into numbers in [0 , 1] such that 
1. Starting from any point in the game where it is the manager’s move, the manager’s 
strategy is a best response to the investor’s strategy. 
2. Starting from any point in the game where it is the investor’s move, the investor’s 
strategy is a best response to the manager’s strategy, given that the investor believes 
that the manager is trustworthy with probability )( t
D
t hP . 
3. The game begins with .0 
DP  
4. Each DtP  is computed from 
D
tP 1  and the manager’s strategy using Bayes’s rule 
whenever possible. 
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I will first define the function D
tP . However, before I define 
D
tP , note that the set of 
subscripts for D
tP  
is different from the set of subscripts for each of dt, mt, t, and kt. While each 
of dt, mt, t, and kt is subscripted using the set {1, 2, . . . , n}, 
D
tP  is subscripted using the set {0, 
1, 2, . . . , n}. The investor enters the game with .0 
DP  He sees d1 and updates to 
DP1  before 
choosing m1. Because the investor’s updating from 
DP0  to 
DP1  occurs before his choice of 
investment for the first period (m1), this necessitates the introduction of an additional element 
(namely, 0) in the set of subscripts for DtP . 
Set .0 
DP  Then, DtP  may be defined as follows: 
P(i) If the manager does not disclose in period 1 (i.e., the manager chooses d1 = 0), 
then 01 
DP , and if the manager discloses in period 1 (i.e., the manager chooses 
d1 = 1), then .01 
DD PP  
P(ii) For t > 1, if the investor does not invest in period t − 1 (i.e., the investor chooses 
mt−1 = 0), then 
D
t
D
t PP 1 . 
P(iii) For t > 1, if the investor invests in period t − 1 (i.e., the investor chooses mt−1 = e) 
and the manager discloses in period t, and the manager returns half of what he 
receives in period t − 1 and 01 
D
tP  (i.e., the manager chooses 1td  and 
1 1 / 2t tk e   ), then  1max (4 / ( )) ,D n ttP l h     . 
P(iv) For t > 1, if the investor invests in period t − 1 (i.e., the investor chooses mt−1 = e) 
but the manager either does not disclose in period t or does not return half of what 
he receives in period t − 1 (i.e., the manager chooses either 0td  or 01 tk ), 
then 0DtP . 
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P(v) If 01 
D
tP , then 0
D
tP . 
D
tP  
is the probability with which the investor believes the manager is trustworthy. The 
game begins with 
0 .
DP    If the manager does not disclose in period 1, then the investor knows 
that the manager is untrustworthy and therefore sets 01 
DP  (point P(i)). For t > 1, if the history 
of play up to period t either includes any instance in which the manager fails to disclose or 
includes any instance in which the manager fails to return half of what he receives, then the 
investor knows that the manager is untrustworthy and therefore sets 0DtP  (point P(iv)). If the 
investor does not invest in any given period, then no Bayesian updating occurs, and the 
investor’s posterior beliefs about the manager’s trustworthiness are the same as his prior beliefs 
about the manager’s trustworthiness (point P(ii)). If the manager has always chosen to disclose 
and has always returned half of what he receives, then  1max (2 / ( )) ,D n tt tP E      (point 
P(iv)). The question is, if the manager has always chosen to disclose and has always returned 
half of what he receives, then when is it that 1(2 / ( ))D n tt tP E
   , and when is it that DtP   ? 
To answer this, note first that a trustworthy manager, by definition, always chooses to disclose 
and always chooses to return half of what he receives. I will argue later that the rational manager 
mimics such behaviour of the trustworthy manager to develop a reputation for being trustworthy. 
If the rational manager does such mimicking with certainty, then no Bayesian updating occurs, 
and the investor’s posterior beliefs about the manager’s trustworthiness are the same as his prior 
beliefs about the manager’s trustworthiness; that is, 1 0
D D D
t tP P P     . However, if the 
rational manager does such mimicking with a certain probability strictly less than 1, then the 
investor’s updated beliefs about a manager’s trustworthiness are given by 1))/(4(  tnDt hlP . 
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In the proof in the appendix, I show that this is consistent with the Bayesian updating criterion 
specified in the definition of the equilibrium. 
Now, I will describe the strategies of the investor and the untrustworthy manager in terms 
of D
tP . The investor’s strategy may be outlined as follows: 
I(i) If 1))/(4(  tnDt hlP , the investor chooses not to invest, that is, mt = 0. 
I(ii) If 1))/(4(  tnDt hlP , the investor chooses to invest, that is, mt = e. 
I(iii) If 1))/(4(  tnDt hlP , with a probability 1 / ( )
D
t tV l h   , the investor chooses 
to invest, and with a probability DtV1 , the investor chooses not to invest. That 
is, with a probability DtV , the investor chooses mt = e, and with a probability 
D
tV1 , the investor chooses mt = 0. 
The investor follows a threshold strategy in which he invests if his beliefs about the 
manager’s trustworthiness ( DtP ) are above the threshold for the period (
1))/(4(  tnhl ) (point 
I(ii)) and does not invest if his beliefs are below the threshold (point I(i)). When his beliefs are 
on the investment threshold (point I(iii)), he is indifferent between investing and not investing. 
He chooses to invest with a probability DtV  
that makes the rational manager indifferent between 
mimicking (to be a trustworthy type) and not mimicking. 
By definition, a trustworthy manager always chooses to disclose and always chooses to 
return half of what he receives. An untrustworthy/rational manager’s strategy depends on t and 
D
tP . The strategy may be outlined as follows: 
M(i) .11 d  
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M(ii) If t = n, the manager does not return anything; that is, the manager chooses 
0nk . 
M(iii) If t < n and tnD
t hlP
 ))/(4( , the manager chooses to disclose and chooses to 
return half of what he receives; that is, the manager chooses 11 td  and 
/ 2t tk e  . 
M(iv) If t < n and tnD
t hlP
 ))/(4( , then with a probability 
)1())/(4/()))/(4(1( Dt
tntnD
t
D
t PhlhlPS 
 , the manager chooses to return 
half of what he receives in period t. With probability DtS1 , the manager chooses 
not to return anything in period t. In the instance in which the manager returns 
half of what he receives in period t, he chooses to disclose in period t +1; that is, 
with a probability DtS , the manager chooses 11 td  and / 2t tk e  , and with a 
probability DtS1 , the manager chooses 0tk . Note that if 0
D
tP , then 
0DtS , and if 
tnD
t hlP
 ))/(4( , then 1DtS . 
The untrustworthy/rational manager always chooses to disclose in period 1 (point M(i)) 
because not doing so reveals to the investor that the manager is untrustworthy. He chooses not to 
return anything as dividend in the last period (point M(ii)) because the alternative of paying a 
nonzero dividend is personally costly to him, and because it is the last period, there are no 
associated expected future benefits. In periods before the last one, he mimics the trustworthy 
manager (points M(iii) and M(iv)) and therefore chooses to disclose his private information and 
to pay back half of the firm’s income as dividend to the investor. The rational manager does such 
mimicking with certainty until a certain point in the game (point M(iii)) and then switches to 
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mimicking with a certain probability ( D
tS ) strictly less than 1 (point M(iv)). The intuition behind 
why the rational manager makes this switch is explained next. 
From I(i)–I(iii), the investor invests in period t + 1 if his beliefs about the manager’s 
trustworthiness are above the investment threshold for that period, that is, if tnD
t hlP

  ))/(4(1 . 
Consider tnD
t hlP
 ))/(4( . If the manager mimics with certainty (point M(iii)), then no 
Bayesian updating occurs, and hence tnD
t
D
t hlPP

  ))/(4(1 . Because 
D
tP 1  is above the 
investment threshold for period t + 1, the investor will invest. Now, consider tnDt hlP
 ))/(4( . 
If the manager continues to mimic with certainty, then tnDt
D
t hlPP

  ))/(4(1 , and the 
investor will not invest in period t + 1. Therefore, the manager switches to mimicking with 
probability DtS  
< 1 (point M(iv)). In the proof in the appendix, I show that DtS  is so chosen that 
the investor’s updated period t + 1 beliefs about the manager’s trustworthiness are exactly on the 
investment threshold for period t + 1. From point I(iii), the investor chooses to invest with 
probability DtV 1  
< 1 when his beliefs are exactly on the threshold. 
Summarizing, the game starts with pure strategy play in which the investor invests with 
probability 1 and the rational manager mimics with probability 1. But at some point in the game, 
it switches to mixed strategy play in which the investor invests with probability DtV 1  
< 1 and the 
rational manager mimics with probability DtS  < 1. There is one exception: when the investor’s 
period zero beliefs about a manager’s trustworthiness are above the investment threshold for the 
last period (i.e., 
0 4 / ( )
DP l h    ), then the game continues in pure strategies and the switch to 
mixed strategy play never occurs. 
Proposition. The strategies (I(i)–I(iii), M(i)–M(iv)) and beliefs (P(i)–P(v)) described 
above constitute a sequential equilibrium. 
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The proof is outlined in the appendix. 
 
4. Properties of the Equilibrium 
4.1. Increasing Investment Threshold 
D
tP 1  
must be at least 1))/(4(  tnhl
 
for the investor to invest with some positive 
probability. This investment threshold 1))/(4(  tnhl
 
may also be thought of as the manager’s 
reputation. The manager starts mixed strategy play in some period t to ensure that the investor’s 
updated (period t + 1) beliefs about the manager’s type are exactly on the threshold. This 
threshold increases in t; that is, the manager’s reputation over time must be progressively higher 
for the investor to invest. For example, if n = 10, l = 1, and h = 5, then this investment threshold 
may be graphed as in Figure 2A. 
 
 
Figure 2A. Investment threshold at which the investor invests with some probability when n = 
10, l = 1, and h = 5 
 
Investor’s  
Threshold 
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The idea is that in the early periods of a repeated game, the investor knows that the 
rational manager is extremely likely to mimic with certainty, and this implies that it is extremely 
likely the investor gets a fair dividend. Therefore he invests even when his beliefs about the 
manager’s trustworthiness are low; that is, the investment threshold is low in the early periods. 
However, in later periods, mixed strategy play may start, and then the rational manager is not as 
likely to pay out a fair dividend. Therefore the threshold at which the investor invests is now 
higher. 
4.2. Perfect Mimicking Strategy 
What happens if the untrustworthy/rational manager follows a strategy of choosing 
1td  and / 2t tk e  ? That is, the untrustworthy manager chooses to mimic to be the 
trustworthy type with probability 1. This strategy will be a part of the equilibrium described 
earlier if )/(40 hlP
D  . However, when )/(40 hlP
D  , then by Bayesian updating, 
DD
t
D
t PPP 01 ......  . At some t = i,  
1
)/(4


inD
i hlP , and therefore the investor does not 
invest in any period it  . In contrast, if the manager follows the strategy outlined in the 
equilibrium described earlier, the investor invests with some positive probability in period it  . 
In other words, perfect mimicking does not constitute equilibrium and will result in lower 
investment. In equilibrium, the manager mimics to be the trustworthy type but does so 
selectively instead of indiscriminately to ensure the credibility associated with his choice in the 
instances in which he actually chooses to mimic (except when )/(40 hlP
D  ). 
For example, if n = 10, l = 1, h = 5, and 4.00 
DP , then the investment threshold is given 
by the blue dotted line in Figure 2B. The way the investor’s beliefs about the manager’s type 
evolve in equilibrium and under the perfect mimicking strategy, respectively, are shown by the 
red dotted line and the green dotted line in Figure 2B. Note that under the perfect mimicking 
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strategy, the investor’s beliefs fall below the investment threshold in period 9 but remain on the 
threshold under equilibrium. Consequently, under perfect mimicking, the investor does not invest 
in periods 9 and 10, but in equilibrium, the investor may invest in both periods. 
 
 
Figure 2B. Investment threshold at which the investor invests with some probability and the 
investor’s beliefs about the manager’s type when n = 10, l = 1 , h = 5, and 
0
DP
 
= 0.4 
 
4.3. Properties of δ and n 
From the investor’s strategy outlined in the previous section, the investor chooses to 
invest in period 1 if 
1 0 (4 / ( ))
D D nP P l h     . δ denotes the prior beliefs with which the game 
begins. It is the investor’s ex ante beliefs about the manager’s trustworthiness. nhl ))/(4( 
 
is the 
investment threshold for period 1. If δ is higher than this threshold, then the investor invests in 
period 1. 
Investor’s Threshold 
Investor’s Beliefs in 
Disclosure Regime 
Investor’s Beliefs if 
the Manager plays 
the ‘Perfect 
Mimicking’ 
strategy 
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Note that as n increases, nhl ))/(4(   decreases; that is, as the game is repeated over a 
larger number of periods, the investment threshold for period 1 becomes lower. With a large n, δ 
can be really small, and yet investment will occur in period 1. 
4.4. Out-of-Equilibrium Beliefs 
What happens if 1))/(4(  tnDt hlP  but the investor chooses mt = e, that is, the beliefs 
are below the investment threshold for period t but the investor chooses to invest? This is a 
violation of the investor’s strategy (I(i)–I(iii)) defined earlier. The question is, what will his 
beliefs be in period t + 1 (denoted by DtP 1 ), given that he violates the equilibrium strategy in 
period t? To answer this, note first that tntnDt hlhlP
  ))/(4())/(4( 1 . Then, by M(iv), the 
rational manager chooses to mimic with probability DtS . Now, if 0
D
tP , then by P(iii), 
tnD
t hlP

  ))/(4(1 , and if 0
D
tP , then by P(v), 01 
D
tP . 
Now, consider what happens if 1))/(4(  tnDt hlP  but the investor chooses mt = 0; that 
is, the beliefs are above the investment threshold for period t but the investor chooses not to 
invest. This is also a violation of the investor’s strategy defined earlier (I(i)–I(iii)). Once again, 
the question arises, what will be the investor’s beliefs in period t + 1 (denoted by DtP 1 ), given that 
he violates the equilibrium strategy in period t? By P(ii), Dt
D
t PP 1 . 
The rational manager can violate the equilibrium strategy by mimicking with less than 
certainty when he should be mimicking with certainty. This will lead to instances in which he 
either does not disclose or does not return (as dividend) to the investor half of what he receives 
as income of the firm. In either case, he will have revealed that he is untrustworthy/rational and, 
by P(iv), 01 
D
tP . 
4.5. Comparison with Exogenously Imposed Information Sharing 
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Now consider the same game with the following modification: the investor learns t ; that 
is, the income of the firm is common knowledge between the investor and the manager. 
Consequently, the manager’s disclosure decision is moot here, and a trustworthy manager is one 
who always chooses to return half of what he receives. The modified timeline is described in 
Figure 3. 
Subject to the differences in how a trustworthy manager is defined, the equilibrium for 
this modified game with exogenously imposed information sharing is identical to that of the 
model described in Section 2, where information sharing was a choice of the manager. The 
investor continues to have a threshold strategy whereby he invests if his beliefs about the 
investor’s trustworthiness are above the investment threshold and does not invest if his beliefs 
are below the threshold. On the threshold, the investor invests with a probability that makes the 
rational manager indifferent between mimicking and not mimicking to be a trustworthy type. The 
investment threshold for this modified game is the same as the investment threshold for the 
model from Section 2. (It is equal to 1))/(4(  tnhl .) Additionally, the probability with which 
the investor invests when his beliefs are exactly on the threshold is also the same. 
The rational manager continues to mimic the behaviour of the trustworthy type to earn a 
reputation for being trustworthy. When the investor’s beliefs about the manager’s trustworthiness 
are above the threshold at which he will invest in the next period, then the rational manager 
mimics with certainty. When the said beliefs are below the said threshold, the rational manager 
switches to mimicking with a probability strictly less than 1. This probability is such that it 
makes the investor indifferent between investing and not investing and is equal to the 
corresponding probability from the model described in Section 2. 
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As with the model in Section 2, the game starts with pure strategy play and then switches 
to mixed strategy play. The point at which the switch occurs is identical, and as before, there is 
one exception—when the investor’s ex ante beliefs about the manager’s trustworthiness are 
above the investment threshold for the last period, then the game continues in pure strategies, 
and the switch does not occur. 
The equilibrium in the case in which information sharing is exogenously imposed is 
identical to the case in which information sharing is voluntary because in the latter case, the 
rational manager (in equilibrium) always chooses to disclose up until such point as he does not 
pay back a dividend and thereby reveals that he is untrustworthy. Once he has revealed that he is 
untrustworthy/rational, it does not matter whether he chooses to voluntarily disclose his 
information. Note that when information sharing is exogenously imposed, dividend payment is 
the only tool available for reputation building, whereas when information is a choice of the 
manager, then dividend payment in conjunction with disclosure is used as a reputation-building 
tool. What is important is the role that information, whether exogenously imposed or voluntarily 
disclosed, plays in managerial efforts at building a reputation for being trustworthy. It reveals the 
state of nature to the investor and forces the rational manager to build a reputation along the lines 
outlined earlier. In the process, the investor receives a fair dividend from the manager. 
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Figure 3. Timeline of the modified game 
 
 
24 
 
5. Conclusion 
This article examines the role information plays in the building of trust and 
trustworthiness in complex economic settings in which there is separation of ownership and 
control of key economic resources. The investment game is a parsimonious way to capture the 
separation of ownership and management that has fuelled business and economic growth over 
the last several centuries. Modelling this gains further preeminence in today’s economy, in which 
asset securitizations and derivative contracts epitomize such separation between risk 
bearers/owners and risk managers. Introducing disclosure in such a model provides a framework 
for analysis of the role of accounting information in a business superstructure built with the 
separation of risk bearing and management as one of its founding pillars. The agents in this game 
are strategic players, unlike the atomistic players of a rational expectations world. This mirrors 
more closely an economic world with a few big players, such as the one that faces us today, with 
few “too big to fail” economic agents. 
In a setting with trustworthy and rational managers, choosing to voluntarily disclose 
private information is a natural act of the trustworthy manager, which the rational manager 
mimics to receive additional future investments. While anecdotally, it seems that information 
should provide opportunities for reputation building, there are subtleties in the process of 
reputation building that are not so obvious. For example, I show that mimicking with certainty is 
suboptimal and that a rational manager (except under certain specific circumstances) chooses 
mimicking with a certain probability strictly less than 1. The only exception is when the 
investor’s beliefs about a manager’s trustworthiness are exceptionally high; then, the manager 
chooses mimicking with certainty to maintain the beliefs at that high level. 
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When voluntary disclosure of private information is replaced by exogenously imposed 
information sharing, it results in a comparable equilibrium characterized by selective mimicking 
of the trustworthy type and thereby provides similar opportunities at facilitating the building of 
reputation for trust and trustworthiness. The setting with exogenously imposed information 
sharing may be thought of as a mandatory disclosure regime that obliterates information 
asymmetry by fiat. The results derived here then say that voluntary disclosure and mandatory 
disclosure are equivalent from a reputation-building perspective. This in turn implies that 
voluntary disclosure makes up for deficiencies in a reporting regime’s mandatory requirements 
by providing as much opportunity for building trust and trustworthiness as exists in a regime 
where such disclosure is mandated. This explains a managerial incentive at providing 
information voluntarily, even when not required to. 
Traditionally, the demand for accounting information is understood to arise from 
information needs of share markets or debt contracting (e.g., Ball, 2001; Ball et al., 2008). Other 
literature (e.g., Grossman, 1981; Dye, 1985) bases the existence of voluntary disclosure of 
private information on investors’ beliefs regarding managers’ information about the value of the 
firm. Generally, managers with superior values voluntarily reveal their private information about 
value because otherwise, investors will assume that nondisclosed values are low. This article 
considers a model of reputation formation under different institutional structures of disclosure to 
show that voluntary disclosure of private information occurs because rational self-interested 
agents have an incentive to look like altruistic or trustworthy agents. 
An interesting question is to look at what happens if the ability for voluntary disclosure 
of private information is removed from the disclosure regime. Defining such a regime and 
comparing it with the model here allows analysis of disclosure’s reputation-building role from 
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another perspective (Lunawat, 2012a). Disclosure is shown to occur in this article because of 
reputation building by rational agents. The effect of such reputation building on economic 
activity is an important question that calls for further study. 
Given the complicated nature of the equilibrium described here, it is natural to ask if 
people actually behave as predicted, and this calls for an empirical examination (Lunawat, 
2012b). While disclosure has been argued to be a managerial talent-signalling device, this article 
abstracts away from this question to focus on reputation building. An unanswered question, then, 
is the role reputation building may play in situations in which managers have different abilities in 
that a better manager has a higher probability of obtaining high firm productivity. 
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Appendix: Proof of Proposition 
Proof. There are two things to verify. First, the investor’s beliefs must be consistent with 
the manager’s strategy in the sense that Bayes rule holds wherever applicable. Second, starting 
from any information set in the game, no player has a profitable deviation, that is, no player has 
an incentive to deviate. 
I first verify the criterion of Bayesian consistency. If the manager chooses d1 = 0, then it 
must be the case that the manager is untrustworthy and 01 
D
tP . If the investor does not invest in 
period t, then he does not learn anything about the manager’s type, and therefore Dt
D
t PP 1 . If 
tnD
t hlP
 ))/(4( , the untrustworthy manager chooses 11 td  and / 2t tk e  . If 0
D
tP , the 
untrustworthy manager chooses 0tk . In both cases, Bayes rule implies 
D
t
D
t PP 1 . If 
)))/(4(,0( tnDt hlP
 , then with a probability DtS , the manager chooses 11 td  and 
/ 2t tk e  , and with a probability 
D
tS1 , the manager chooses 0tk . In the instance the 
manager chooses 0tk , it must be the case that the manager is untrustworthy and 01 
D
tP . In 
the instance the manager returns half of what he receives in period t, Bayes rule requires the 
following: 
D
tP 1  
Prob (the manager is trustworthy | the manager returns half of what he receives)
 
Prob (the manager is trustworthy and returns half of what he receives) 
Prob (the manager returns half of what he receives)
  
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Prob (the manager returns half |the manager is trustworthy) Prob (the manager is trustworthy)
Prob (the manager returns half | the manager is trustworthy) Prob (the manager is trustworthy) 
 +Prob (the

 manager returns half | the manager is untrustworthy) Prob (the manager is untrustworthy)
 
 
 
 
= 
)1(.1
.1
D
t
D
t
D
t
D
t
PSP
P

 
= 
tn
hl








4
 
This satisfies the criterion of Bayesian consistency. 
I next verify that the investor’s strategy is optimal. The investor’s payoff from not 
investing (choosing mt = 0) = e. If 
tnD
t hlP
 ))/(4( , the untrustworthy manager chooses 
/ 2t tk e  , and then the investor’s expected payoff from investing (choosing mt = e) 
 2/)()2/( hle  . Because (l + h) > 4, the investor’s expected payoff from choosing mt = e is 
greater than the investor’s payoff from choosing mt = 0, making it optimal for the investor to 
choose mt = e. 
If tnDt hlP
 ))/(4( , then with probability DtS , the untrustworthy manager chooses 
/ 2t tk e  , and with probability ,1
D
tS  the untrustworthy manager chooses 0tk . Therefore 
the investor’s expected payoff from investing (choosing mt = e) 
  DtDtDt SPPhle )1(2/)(2/  . 
Inserting )1())/(4/()))/(4(1( Dt
tntnD
t
D
t PhlhlPS 
  in the expression for the 
investor’s expected payoff and simplifying the expression yields the investor’s expected payoff 
1)4/)((  tnDt hleP . This implies that the investor’s expected payoff from choosing mt = e is 
greater when 1))/(4(  tnDt hlP  and the investor’s expected payoff from choosing mt = 0 is 
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greater when 1))/(4(  tnDt hlP . (Note that .))/(4())/(4(
1 tntnD
t hlhlP
  ) If 
1))/(4(  tnDt hlP , then the investor’s expected payoff from choosing mt = e is equal to the 
investor’s payoff from choosing mt = 0. At this point, the investor is indifferent between 
choosing mt = e and choosing mt = 0. Therefore, with probability 
D
tV , the investor chooses mt = 
e, and with probability D
tV1 , the investor chooses mt = 0. The choice of the probability 
D
tV  is 
such that it makes the rational manager indifferent between choosing 
1 1 / 2t tk e    and choosing 
01 tk . To verify the manager’s indifference at this point, note that the manager’s payoff from 
choosing 01 tk  is 1te   and the manager’s expected payoff from choosing 1 1 / 2t tk e    
is 
1 / 2 ( ) / 2
D
t te eV l h   . Because 1 / ( )
D
t tV l h   , the manager’s expected payoff from 
choosing 01 tk  
equals the manager’s payoff from choosing 1 1 / 2t tk e   . 
Finally, I verify that the untrustworthy/rational manager’s strategy is optimal. If d1 = 0, it 
implies that the manager must be untrustworthy ( 01 
DP ), and therefore the investor chooses m1 
= 0. If d1 = 1, it implies that the manager may be trustworthy ( 1 0
D DP P   ), and then if 
(4 / ( ))nl h   , the investor will invest2. Consequently, it is optimal for the manager to choose 
d1 = 1. If t = n, the manager’s payoff from choosing 0nk  
is ne , while the manager’s payoff 
from choosing / 2n nk e   
is / 2ne , making it optimal for the manager to choose 0nk . 
If t < n and tnDt hlP
 ))/(4( , then the investor chooses mt+1 = e. Thus the manager’s 
payoff from choosing 0tk  
is te , while the manager’s expected payoff from choosing 
/ 2t tk e   
is 1/ 2 ( ) / 2 ( ) / 2t t te eE e e l h       , making it optimal for the manager to 
                                                 
2
 If (4 / ( )) ,nl h  
 
the investor will not invest, making the rational manager indifferent between d1 = 0 and d1 = 1. 
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choose / 2t tk e  . If 
tnD
t hlP
 ))/(4( , then the investor chooses mt+1 = e with probability 
D
tV 1 , and the manager’s expected payoff from choosing / 2t tk e   
is 
1 1/ 2 ( )
D
t t te eE V    / 2 (( ) / 2)( / ( )) .t t te e l h l h e         
At this point, the manager is 
indifferent between choosing 0tk and choosing / 2t tk e  . Therefore the manager chooses 
0tk  
with such a probability (and / 2t tk e  with complementary probability) that makes the 
investor indifferent between choosing mt+1 = e and choosing mt+1 = 0. The investor is indifferent 
between choosing mt+1 = e and choosing mt+1 = 0 when 
tnD
t hlP

  ))/(4(1 . Now, 
tnD
t
D
t hlPP

  ))/(4(1  requires the manager choose / 2t tk e   with probability 1. 
Now I am required to verify that if t < n and tnDt hlP
 ))/(4( , then with a probability 
)1())/(4/()))/(4(1( Dt
tntnD
t
D
t PhlhlPS 
 , the manager chooses to return half of what he 
receives in period t. Suppose instead that the manager chooses / 2t tk e   with a probability 
D
tS    for some 0   such that 1
D
tS   . Then, the posterior probability 1tP  
is given by 
 )1)((/ DtDtDtDt PSPP   . Now, tnDtt hlPP   ))/(4(11 . Therefore, the investor chooses 
mt+1 = 0. This implies that the sum of the manager’s expected payoff in periods t and (t + 1) = 
(1 ) ( / 2)( )D Dt t t te S e S      . In contrast, if the manager chooses / 2t tk    with a 
probability DtS , then his expected payoff = 1 1(1 ) ( / 2 )
D D D
t t t t t t t tE e S S e eV e           . 
Because the manager’s expected payoff from choosing / 2t tk e   with a probability 
D
tS  is 
higher than his expected payoff from choosing / 2t tk e   with a probability 
D
tS   , he does not 
choose / 2t tk e   with a probability 
D
tS   . Similarly, it can be shown that the manager does 
not choose / 2t tk e   with a probability 
D
tS   for some 0   such that 0
D
tS   . The only 
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case remaining to be ruled out is one in which the manager chooses / 2t tk e   with a 
probability D
tS   for some 0  such that 0
D
tS   , that is, the case in which the manager 
never chooses / 2t tk e  . In this case, the posterior probability 11 tP ; that is, given a return 
of / 2t tk e  , the investor believes with probability 1 that the manager is trustworthy. This 
strategy can never constitute an equilibrium because a profitable deviation for the untrustworthy 
manager is to mimic to be the trustworthy type and choose / 2t tk e  , and then because 
11 tP , the investor will chose mt+1 = e. 
This completes the proof that the set of beliefs and strategies described earlier constitutes 
a sequential equilibrium. Subject to the arbitrariness involved in specifying the out-of-
equilibrium beliefs in a sequential equilibrium, the equilibrium described here is unique, and the 
uniqueness follows from the proof outlined in this appendix. 
 
